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No. 20180055-CA
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
__________________
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee
v.
JOSEPH CRESCENCIO GRANADOS,
Defendant/Appellant.
__________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

INTRODUCTION
Joseph Granados was convicted of attempted murder, possession of a
dangerous weapon by a restricted person, and criminal mischief. (The Sentence,
Judgment, Commitment is attached as Addendum A). These charges arose from
a shooting that occurred around 4pm. Granados was also convicted of failure to
stop at the command of a police officer, possession of a controlled substance, and
possession of drug paraphernalia. Those charges related to an incident that
occurred later in the evening. Although there was evidence connecting the car
Granados was driving later in the evening to the earlier shooting, no witness
identified him as the shooter. This Court should reverse because the evidence of
identity was insufficient to sustain convictions for the charges related to the
shooting.

Second, this Court should reverse all of the convictions because the judge
decided to replace a juror over counsel’s objection and without questioning the
juror first. The trial court believed the juror was sleeping for portions of the trial.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: Whether the evidence of identity was sufficient to sustain
convictions for attempted murder, possession of a dangerous weapon, and
criminal mischief — the charges related to the shooting.
Standard of Review/Preservation: This Court “review[s] the trial court’s
denial of the motion for directed verdict for correctness.” Salt Lake City v.
Valdez-Sadler, 2015 UT App 203, ¶ 6. This issue was preserved. R:1026-31 (the
relevant portions of the transcript are attached as Addendum B).
Issue II: Whether the court erred when it dismissed a juror without first
questioning the juror when the court believed the juror had fallen asleep during
the trial.
Standard of Review/Preservation: Utah courts generally review challenges
to a judge’s ruling regarding sleeping jurors for abuse of discretion. See State v.
Lesley, 672 P.2d 79, 82 (Utah 1983); State v. Pace, 527 P.2d 658, 659 (Utah
1974). Counsel preserved this issue when he objected to dismissing the juror,
explained that counsel had seen the juror in question taking notes and paying
attention, and reminded the court that the defense had strategically selected the
jury. R:789-92 (the relevant portions of the transcript are attached as Addendum
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C). Additionally, the prosecution agreed that it would be appropriate to question
the juror before dismissing her. R:789.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND THE FACTS
SM was driving home from work around 4pm on June 6, 2016, when he
saw a maroon car swerving ahead of him on 4800 West. R:567-69; 668 (time of
incident was 4:13pm). When the maroon car pulled into the right turn lane at
around 70th South, SM passed the car on the left. R:571. Instead of turning
right, the maroon car pulled up alongside SM. R:573. The driver of the maroon
car showed SM that he had a gun. R:576. SM called 911 as the car followed him
on Grizzly Way. R:577. The maroon car hit SM’s car, forcing it onto a residential
lawn. R:581. The driver of the maroon car then fired a gun at SM. R:581. There
were eight bullet holes in the car and one in a nearby building. R:818. One shot
grazed SM’s neck, although he was not seriously injured. R:581; 435.
SM did not make an identification of the perpetrator at trial. SM did testify
that the driver had tattoos on his arm. R:571. There was evidence that Granados
had tattoos. R: 987. A woman who was standing on Grizzly Way during the
incident did not see the driver or the license plate, but she noticed that the
maroon car had sustained damage on the front passenger’s side, and that it had a
triangle decal in the window. R:589-90. Another witness made eye contact with
the driver in the maroon car. R:602. At trial, she testified that the driver had a
round face, dark eyes, dark short hair, and a mustache. R:604. This general
description did not exclude Granados. State’s Ex. 50c. She observed the driver
3

get out of his car to pick up the bumper, which had fallen off, and put it inside the
car. R:606. When presented with a photo array the day after the shooting that
included Granados’s photo, she selected a different photo as resembling the
offender. R:608-10; 1009. None of the State’s witnesses identified Granados as
the shooter.
The day before the shooting, a property crimes detective was looking for a
red 2002 Chevy Malibu belonging to MA. R:627. He was also looking for Joseph
Granados, who he believed had a previous relationship with MA. R:627. The
detective located Granados in the Malibu at a McDonald’s. R:629. He tried to get
Granados to pull over, but Granados fled. R:632.
The police suspected the Malibu might have been involved in the shooting.
R:725. The evening of the shooting, a detective looking for Granados spotted him
in a Chevy Malibu with front-end damage near 3100 South and Bangerter around
6:15pm. R:708. Granados did not stop and the detective lost sight of him.
R:719-20. A second officer followed Granados in a high-speed chase that lasted
over twelve minutes. R:741; 748; 751.
The chase ended with the officer apprehending Granados after Granados
briefly attempted to flee on foot. R:752. The officer searched Granados and
found a glass pipe and methamphetamine. R:765.
Crime scene technicians processed the Malibu. R:831. It had sustained
damage, it had a “Baby on Board!” decal on the back windshield, and there was a
bumper in the backseat. R:779; State’s Ex. 21, 24, 25. The technicians tested the
4

bumper for fingerprints. R:894. A partial palm print — the only evidence
discovered on the bumper — excluded Granados. R:844-46.
The car floor was dirty. R:911; State’s Ex. 25, 28, 31. A crime scene
technician recovered from the floor a 34-caliber bullet and a 40-caliber bullet.
R:836. She also recovered ten 40-caliber shell casings. R:837; 889.
A crime scene technician tested the bullets and shell casings for DNA.
R:885. The test involved placing each bullet or casing, one at a time, in a buffer
solution. R:884. The technician poured the buffer solution through a filter
designed to catch cells. R:886-87. She then used the same buffer solution for the
next bullet or casing, and ran it through the same filter. R:887-88; 890-91. The
technician sent the filter to Sorenson Forensics. R:892.
A DNA analyst from Sorenson testified that the filter contained DNA from
two contributors. R:956. Granados’s DNA profile matched the major
contributor, but the amount of his DNA in the bullet and casing mixture was
small. R:971. The analyst explained that there would be no way to know which
item of the ten casings and two bullets contained the DNA, only that the mixture
of all of them contained DNA. R:968. She also explained that the test could not
discern whether the DNA ended up on the bullets or casings from direct contact
or through transfer from something else with DNA on it. R:967. She
acknowledged a person who was touching a car would leave DNA in it. R:912-13.
Sweat contains DNA — and there was testimony Granados was sweating, R:987;
775 — so a person sweating in a car would leave DNA. R:899; 912-13.
5

The analyst testified that she had never before pulled a full DNA profile
from a spent shell casing. R:970. The technician similarly testified that in her
seventeen years as a crime scene technician she had never before seen a full DNA
profile pulled from a shell casing. R:914. The technician testified that heat
damages DNA, but studies conflict on whether firing a gun would destroy any
DNA on the shell casings. R:915.
The State charged Granados with multiple counts related to the shooting —
attempted murder, multiple counts of felony discharge of a firearm, possession of
a firearm by a restricted person, and criminal mischief for damaging SM’s car.
R:1-5. The State also charged Granados with failure to stop at the command of a
law officer, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of
paraphernalia. R:1-5. The case proceeded to trial. R:475.
The parties selected eight jurors and one alternate. R:540. Juror 16
graduated from the University of Utah and retired after careers as a travel agent
and elementary educator. R:487. She followed the news through Time Magazine
and the Salt Lake Tribune. R:488.
The alternate juror was a high school graduate who worked as a project
engineer for JWright Companies. R:489. He read “outdoor magazines like
American Rifleman” and watched “Fox News.” R:489-90.
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On the second day of trial, 1 the officer who apprehended Granados testified
about the car chase and the State played a video from the officer’s body camera
depicting the chase, State’s Ex. 56. R:739. During this portion of the trial, the
court called for a break. R:742. When the jury was excused, the court said, “The
reason I did that is Juror No. 16 keeps falling asleep. And yesterday the same
thing, is the reason I took some breaks. And I’m a little concerned right in the
middle of the presentation that usually would take someone’s attention, she’s
noticeably falling asleep.” R:743. Defense counsel said, “I got to say I’m getting
tired of the videos too,” and that he “hadn’t noticed” the juror sleeping; he was
initially open to the possibility of changing alternate jurors before realizing which
juror was the subject of concern. R:743-44. The court said that it had the jurors
take a break to stand up on the first day of trial because Juror 16 was sleeping.
R:743. On the first day of trial, the judge had called for a “stand break” during
cross-examination of an officer who investigated a scene near the shooting.
R:666. At that point in the trial, the defense had been establishing a time line for
the shooting and the subsequent car chase. R:661-66.
After the recess, the court stated that it had decided to dismiss Juror 16.
R:744. The court had heard from two staff members that Juror 16 was “sleeping
The first day of trial included jury selection and testimony from SM, R:564;
three witnesses from the Grizzly Way neighborhood, R:584, 600, 635; the
property crimes detective who saw Granados the day before the shooting, R:626;
and an officer who investigated a scene near the shooting, R:647. On the second
day of trial, a detective who followed and lost Granados testified and the officer
who followed and apprehended Granados was testifying when the court decided
to dismiss Juror 16. R:701; 724; 743.
1
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for a significant period of time” and decided “she was obviously falling asleep
here.” R:744.
Defense counsel reiterated that he had not noticed the juror sleeping, but
that in his experience he had “seen jurors nodding off on occasion” in many other
trials. R:745. He also argued that the videos were not a critical part of the case.
R:745.
The court responded, “It happened yesterday. And again, talking to those
people who were with me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five minutes
asleep.” R:745.
Defense counsel objected to dismissing Juror 16. R:745. He argued that he
had seen her taking notes and paying attention. R:789. And the defense had
“strategically selected her.” R:791. Counsel requested that the court question the
juror before dismissing her. R:789-92. The prosecutor agreed that “it would be
appropriate to ask her” questions about the court’s observation that she was
sleeping. R:789; 791-92.
The court decided to dismiss the juror without questioning her first.
R:789. The court stated that he had seen her “look up, close her eyes, and then
the head kind of nod forward, and it happened repeatedly.” R:790. The court
“agree[d] that she was trying to be a diligent juror, but” the court and the two
court staff saw the juror appear to be sleeping “multiple times during significant
parts of the trial.” R:791. The court ruled that it did not “matter at this point
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whether she knows that she missed it or not. The fact is that I observed her and
my staff observed her missing significant parts of the trial.” R:791.
The jury convicted Granados of all charged counts. R:304-05. The parties
had agreed that the court would decide the possession of a weapon by a restricted
person separately. R:1146. Although there was no gun in evidence, the court
found Granados guilty of possession of a weapon based on a prior conviction and
“the jury having found the defendant was knowingly in possession of a firearm.”
R:1146.
The court granted a motion to merge the discharge of a firearm counts with
attempted murder. R:1145. The court sentenced Granados to three years to life
for attempted murder, one to fifteen years for possession of a dangerous weapon,
zero to five years for criminal mischief, zero to five years for failure to respond to
a command of an officer, and credit for time served on the remaining
misdemeanors. R:1186-87. The court ran all the felonies consecutively. R:1187.
Granados filed a timely notice of appeal. R:397.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse the counts related to the shooting — attempted
murder, possession of a dangerous weapon, and criminal mischief — for
insufficient evidence of identity. None of the witnesses identified Granados. The
DNA evidence was more consistent with presence in the car than participation in
the shooting. And additional evidence — fingerprints, an eyewitness photo array,
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and the absence of any connection between Granados and the shooting victim —
pointed to innocence.
Second, this Court should reverse all the counts because the trial court
dismissed a juror without questioning her. As the defense explained, the juror
was strategically selected, had been paying attention, and the court dismissed her
for sleeping during a portion of the trial that was not critical. The error was
prejudicial because there is a reasonable likelihood that a strategically selected
juror would not have been as inclined to convict.
ARGUMENT
I.

The evidence was insufficient to prove that Granados was
involved in the shooting.
The evidence of identity was insufficient for the crimes related to the

shooting — attempted murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a dangerous
weapon by a restricted person. This Court will reverse a conviction for
insufficient evidence when, viewing “the evidence and all inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict . . . the
evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed
the crime.” State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 15. “[A] guilty verdict is not
legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or
speculative possibilities of guilt.” Id. ¶ 18 (alterations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court “cannot take a speculative leap across a
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remaining [evidentiary] gap in order to sustain a verdict.” Id.; see also State v.
Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 7 (stating that a jury verdict must be based on
reasonable inferences and not just “speculation and conjecture”). “Every element
of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v.
Harman, 767 P.2d 567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). “If the evidence does not
support those elements, the verdict must fail.” Id.
A disputed element of all the crimes related to the shooting was identity.
R:1116; 1119 (defense arguing in closing that counts related to shooting “require
identification, and we don’t have it”). “It is well-settled that an essential element
that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is the identification
of a defendant as the person who perpetrated the crime charged.” State v.
Cowlishaw, 2017 UT App 181, ¶ 13 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Under Utah law, the identification of a driver can be proved by
circumstantial rather than direct evidence. See id. In State v. Milligan, the
defendant “contend[ed] that the evidence was insufficient” to prove he was
driving without a license because the testifying officer “did not actually see
defendant operating his van.” 727 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 1986). However, the
defendant told a police officer that he had been driving the vehicle, so the
evidence was sufficient. Id.
The evidence of identity was likewise sufficient where the defendant was in
the vehicle “immediately” after the crime and a “search of the area revealed no
other persons involved.” State v. Lawson, 688 P.2d 479, 483 (Utah 1984); see
11

also State v. Harris, 2015 UT App 282, ¶ 11 (stating that the evidence was
sufficient to show that the defendant committed various crimes in the course of
burglarizing a store where he was the “only person observed in the vicinity of the
store.”)
Cases from outside jurisdictions provide examples where evidence of a
person’s connection to a car was insufficient to prove the person was driving the
car at the time of the crime. For example, in State v. Frieday, a Court of Appeals
of Washington case, the defendant contended that “the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was the driver of the car underlying the
changes on the date in question.” 184 Wash. App. 1037 at *1 (Wash. Ct. App.
2014). An officer pulled over a white male with dark brown hair, but the officer
never saw the man’s face because the car drove away. Id. The officer located the
car, but not the driver, at the defendant’s home address and discovered that the
defendant owned the car. Id. The defendant met the officer’s general
description. Id. at *3. The appellate court held that the “vague, general
description” of the driver was “insufficient to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt identity.” Id. at *3.
In Patterson v. State, a driver in a maroon Honda Accord harassed another
driver, who observed that he was “a male with a dark complexion” and wrote
down the license plate number. 650 S.E.2d 770, 772 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). The
license plate number was registered to the defendant’s sister. Id. “This evidence
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was insufficient for a rational trier of fact to find that [the defendant] was the
driver beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 774.
In State v. Coffman, the State presented evidence that the defendant’s
girlfriend’s car had been used in a chase and the driver had fled on foot. 767
S.E.2d 704, at *1 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014). The defendant’s wallet, including an
identification, was in the front seat of the vehicle. Id. The Court of Appeals of
North Carolina held that even if the evidence showed “defendant’s presence in
the vehicle at some point in the past, it was insufficient to show that defendant
was operating the vehicle during the specific time when the high-speed chase
took place.” Id. at *3.
In Granados’s case, the marshaled evidence shows that Granados had a
previous relationship with the car’s owner, R:627, that he met the general
description of the shooter, R:571, and that he was driving the car the day before
the shooting and hours after the shooting — at both times, the police attempted
to stop him and he fled. R:752. Additionally, Granados’s DNA was on one or
more of the items recovered in the car he was driving during the chase — a 34caliber bullet, a 40-caliber bullet, and ten 40-caliber shell casings. R:837; 889;
836.
This case is therefore more like the extra-jurisdictional cases where
connection to the car and matching a general description were insufficient to
establish identity beyond a reasonable doubt at the time of the crime. See
Patterson, 650 S.E.2d at 772; Coffman, 767 S.E.2d at *3; Frieday, 184 Wash.
13

App. 1037 at *1-3. Granados’s case is unlike Milligan, where the defendant made
admissions. 727 P.2d at 215. And it is distinguishable from Lawson, where the
defendant was connected to the vehicle in the immediate aftermath of the crime.
688 P.2d at 483.
The State’s evidence, including the DNA evidence and the flight from the
police, were insufficient to sustain a conviction. “When the evidence supports
more than one possible conclusion, none more likely than the other, the choice of
one possibility over another can be no more than speculation; while a reasonable
inference arises when the facts can reasonably be interpreted to support a
conclusion that one possibility is more probable than another.” Cristobal, 2010
UT App 228, ¶ 16. “[F]light from the scene of the crime does not, in itself, prove
his involvement but is a circumstance from which his involvement may be
inferred.” Id. ¶ 15. In Granados’s case, flight was particularly weak evidence of
guilt because Granados had also fled from the police the day before the shooting.
R:632. Under the facts and circumstances of Granados’s case, the jury could not
infer that Granados was guilty of the shooting because he fled from the police
again over two hours after the shooting.
Likewise, the DNA evidence was more consistent with mere presence in the
car than it was with participation in the shooting. The State’s DNA analyst tested
multiple items from inside the car with the same filter, making it impossible to
tell which item contained Granados’s DNA. R:968. Some scientific studies
suggest that the items directly related to the shooting, the spent casings, would
14

have been stripped of any DNA when they were fired. R:915. Consistent with
those studies, the State’s DNA analyst and DNA technician had never before
recovered DNA from a spent casing. R:970; 914. Of the two remaining items,
one was an unfired bullet of a different caliber from the gun used in the shooting.
R: 836. It would be speculation to suggest that the DNA came from the shell
casings as opposed to the unfired bullet of a different caliber, which was not
involved in the shooting. See Cristobal, 2010 UT App 228, ¶ 16.
Furthermore, the DNA test could not discern whether the DNA ended up
on the bullets or casings from direct contact or through transfer from something
else with DNA on it. R:967. The evidence was uncontested that Granados was
driving the car during a high-speed chase. R:987. The chase would have shifted
items in the messy car. R:786. Additionally, Granados would have been
breathing, sweating, and touching things in the car, all of which leave DNA.
R:899-900; 912-13. It is therefore speculation based on an unlikely scenario that
Granados’s DNA was on the spent shell casing from loading and firing the gun, an
activity that degrades DNA. R:915. It is much more likely that his DNA
transferred to items that were already in the car. “[A] guilty verdict is not legally
valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt.” Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 18 (alterations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, the stronger circumstantial evidence pointed to innocence.
An eyewitness at the time of the shooting observed the driver get out of his car to
15

pick up the bumper, which had fallen off, and put it inside the car. R:606. The
car Granados was driving had a bumper in the backseat. R:779; State’s Ex. 21,
24, 25. The State found a partial palm print on the bumper, but it was not
Granados’s. R:894; 844-46. This evidence suggested that someone else was
driving the car, and picking up the bumper, at the time of the shooting.
Furthermore, an eyewitness who made eye contact with the shooter looked
at a photo array the day after the shooting. R:602; 604. The photo array
included Granados’s photo, but the eyewitness selected only a different photo as
resembling the offender. R:608-10; 1009.
Another piece of circumstantial evidence pointing to innocence was that
Granados was completely unconnected to the shooting victim and had no reason
to commit the crime. R:1105. The State could only remind the jury that it did not
have to show a motive. R:1105. The prosecutor speculated that Granados could
have mistaken the victim for someone else. R:1105. But there was no evidence
that Granados was motivated to kill a third party.
In summary, the marshaled evidence raises only a speculative possibility of
guilt. The reasonable inferences from the evidence point to innocence. This
Court should therefore reverse and vacate the convictions related to the shooting.
II.

The court erred when it dismissed a juror suspected of sleeping
without first questioning her.
The court erred when it replaced a juror whom the defense had

strategically selected. R:791. Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) states, “If a
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juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during trial and an alternate juror has
been selected, the case shall proceed using the alternate juror.” The court erred
in Granados’s case because it could not determine, without first questioning the
juror, that the juror was sleeping to the point of disqualification from service.
Utah cases demonstrate that sleeping for brief periods does not disqualify a
juror. In State v. Mellor, “[t]he trial court found that the juror to all outward
appearances at several different times had gone to sleep, but only for two or three
minutes, just a short time.” 272 P. 635, 639 (Utah 1928). The juror admitted he
“‘dozed off’ several times.” Id. But he claimed he was ‘not unconscious,’ and . . .
‘heard and understood all that transpired in the courtroom during the trial.’” Id.
The Utah Supreme Court held that although “the juror, at brief intervals, did doze
off, or fell asleep, yet on the record [the appellate court] cannot say that the juror
did not hear and fully comprehend the substance of the testimony of the witness.”
Id.
In State v. Pace, “[t]wo onlookers said two of the jurors consciously went to
sleep” and the judge observed that one “did doze for a second, twice.” 527 P.2d
658, 659 (Utah 1974). The Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s denial of
a mistrial, noting that there was “nothing . . . reflecting that the juror could have
been ensconced, so as to have stupefied the veniremen.” Id.; see also United
States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 78 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding no harm where juror
“perhaps had slept for a very brief moment, [but] was generally alert and
attentive to the evidence”); Samad v. United States, 812 A.2d 226, 230 (D.C.
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2002) (“To be sure, brief lapses in attention that are not prejudicial may be
excused.”).
In Granados’s case, the court’s observation that the the juror dozed for
periods of up to five minutes was not necessarily disqualifying. R:745. The court
stated, “It happened yesterday. And again, talking to those people who were with
me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five minutes asleep.” R:745. But
the court also said that, when it happened the previous day, the judge had called
for standing breaks. R:743; 666. Defense counsel noted, “I do know that in many
of the trials that I’ve done, I’ve seen jurors nodding off on occasion.” R:745. The
court was incorrect that briefly dozing off disqualified the juror.
Furthermore, the Pace court noted that it was significant when in the case
the juror was observed sleeping. Pace,527 P.2d at 659 n.2. As defense counsel in
Granados’s case pointed out, the twelve-minute video of the police chase was not
a critical part of the State’s case. R:745; 741; 748; 751; 743 (Defense counsel: “I
got to say I’m getting tired of the videos, too, but . . .”). The first day of trial, the
court had called for a standing break while the defense was cross-examining an
officer to establish a time line for the shooting and the car chase. R:661-66. This
was evidence that was uncontested and explored at other points in the trial.
R:719 (detective saying the vehicle was spotted at 6:15pm); 567 (SM testifying the
shooting happened around 4pm).
The court erred when it declined to question the juror. The defense
requested that the court question the juror, and the prosecutor agreed that
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questioning would be appropriate. R:789. This appears to be standard in Utah:
in Mellor, “the juror himself testified that because of some work he had done
during the previous night and because the room was close he ‘dozed off’” but
“‘heard and understood all that transpired in the courtroom during the trial.’”
Mellor, 272 P. at 639. In State v. Anderson, the allegedly sleeping juror “filed an
affidavit” before the court made a finding of fact. 251 P. 362, 364 (Utah 1926).
Other jurisdictions have more explicitly clarified the appropriate follow-up
procedure for courts who suspect that a juror fell asleep. “The trial court should
begin, for example, with a hearing to determine whether the juror had been
asleep and, if so, whether the juror had missed essential portions of the trial.”
Golsun v. United States, 592 A.2d 1054, 1057 (D.C. 1991) (alterations omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted). When a judge receives reliable information
about a juror’s inattention, “the judge must take further steps to determine
appropriate intervention. Typically the next step is to conduct a voir dire of the
potentially inattentive juror, in an attempt to investigate whether the juror
remains capable of fulfilling his or her obligation to render a verdict based on all
of the evidence.” Commonwealth v. McGhee, 25 N.E.3d 251, 256 (Mass. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
In Granados’s case, the court’s observations did not disqualify the juror
automatically. Defense counsel “hadn’t noticed” the juror sleeping. R:743.
Moreover, defense counsel did not want to dismiss the juror because he saw “her
taking notes” and “trying to pay attention.” R:789. A Massachusetts trial “judge
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pointed out that ‘some people, when they concentrate, they close their eyes.’” Id.
at 255; accord Pelham v. Page, 6 Ark. 535, 538 (Ark. 1846) (“He may have
appeared to have been asleep, when in truth he was not so.”); Cont’l Cas. Co. v.
Semple, 112 S.W. 1122, 1123 (Ky. 1908) (“the juror himself swore that he was not
asleep at any time during the trial, that he had a habit of closing his eyes when
listening to others, and that he heard all that was said by both witnesses and
lawyers”); McClary v. State, 75 Ind. 260, 265 (1881) (“the affidavit filed in
support of this cause did not aver that the juror actually fell asleep, but only that
he had his eyes closed, and appeared to be asleep”); Dick v. Dick, 58 P.2d 1125,
1126 (Kan. 1936) (“there was testimony that he was not asleep, but had simply
relaxed and partly closed his eyes while listening to the testimony”).
Although the trial judge and two court staff believed they saw the juror fall
asleep, R:791, it was error to dismiss the juror over defense counsel’s objection,
R:745; 791, without questioning her first.
The court’s error was prejudicial. This Court will reverse where, “without
the error there was a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for the
defendant.” State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 919 (Utah 1987) (emphasis omitted)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
As an initial matter, there is a reasonable likelihood that questioning the
juror would have alleviated the court’s concerns that she had missed significant
portions of the trial. As argued above, the juror was not observed sleeping during
critical portions of the trial, R:743, a juror can close her eyes and still pay
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attention, McGhee, 25 N.E.3d at 255, and even briefly nodding off is not
disqualifying. Mellor, 272 P. at 639.
Defense counsel explained that the defense had strategically selected the
juror. R:789-92. Voir dire is “a very important part of trial procedure.” Wayne R.
LaFave et al., 6 Criminal Procedure, § 22.3(a), at 71 (3rd ed. 2007). It is the
process “by which both the defense and the prosecution try to eliminate . . .
prospective jurors who appear sympathetic to the opposition or at least
unsympathetic to their side.” Id. “‘Many attorneys believe that trials are
frequently won or lost during this process.’” Id. “The process by which the
principal jurors and alternate jurors are chosen is crucial to the preservation of
the right to an impartial jury. . . . The primary function of a peremptory challenge
is to allow parties to strike prospective jurors whom they have good reason to
believe might be biased but who are not so clearly and obviously partial that they
could otherwise be excluded from the panel.” Bruckshaw v. Frankford Hosp. of
City of Philadelphia, 58 A.3d 102, 112 (Pa. 2012). Additionally, “[a]s a strategic
matter, counsel may decide, as the number of available peremptory challenges
decreases, to accept jurors with unappealing characteristics or make
compromises about who is an acceptable juror.” Id. “[T]he parties have little
reason to save their peremptory challenges for the last alternate chosen because
there is only a small chance of the last alternate juror deliberating with the jury.”
Id.
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For example, in this case Juror 16 was college educated. R:487. She had
insight and experience dealing with people as a travel agent and had a career in
education. R:487. She followed the news through Time Magazine and the Salt
Lake Tribune. R:488.
The alternate juror did not have a college education. R:489. He read
“outdoor magazines like American Rifleman” and “Fox News.” R:489-90. Fox
News is known for coverage advocating tough-on-crime policies. E.g., Nick
Summers, Fox News Coverage of the Trayvon Martin Case Criticized (March 21,
2012), The Daily Beast, https://www.thedailybeast.com/fox-news-coverage-ofthe-trayvon-martin-case-criticized?ref=scroll (“Fox has been known for its
aggressive coverage of stories relating to . . . crime.”); see also Maurice
Chammah, American Sheriff (May 5, 2016), The Atlantic,
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/05/americansheriff/481131/ (“David Clarke, the . . . pro-mass-incarceration, Fox News
Favorite . . .”).
The court’s error here is similar to an error that requires counsel to use a
peremptory challenge on a juror that should have been excused for cause. In
both instances, the defense is unfairly disadvantaged in its selection of the jury.
In the case of a wasted peremptory challenge, the Utah Supreme Court overruled
precedent holding that it is presumptively prejudicial because a “party should not
be compelled to waste” a peremptory challenge and the “juror which remained
because the plaintiffs had no challenge to remove him may have been a hawk
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amid seven doves and imposed his will upon them.” Crawford v. Manning, 542
P.2d 1091, 1093 (Utah 1975), overruled by State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398
(Utah 1994) (“To prevail on a claim of error based on the failure to remove a juror
for cause, a defendant must demonstrate prejudice, viz., show that a member of
the jury was partial or incompetent.”).
However, where counsel has already selected the jury and the defense
objects that replacing a juror with the alternate juror would frustrate the
defense’s strategic selection, a defendant can show a reasonable likelihood of a
more favorable outcome without showing that a member of the jury panel should
have been excluded for cause.
First, counsel and the defendant have had an opportunity to view the jurors
during the presentation of evidence. In Grandos’s case, the defense had observed
Juror 16 taking notes and wanted her to remain on the jury. R:789. The
circumstances are different from a case where defense counsel is merely selecting
which jurors to strike before the presentation of evidence.
Second, it would open the door to misconduct to adopt a per se rule that,
absent proof of a juror’s actual bias or incompetence, it is never prejudicial to
replace a juror with an alternate. The appellate courts cannot “ensure fair trial
and protect the integrity of the jury” if they “impose the impossible burden of
requiring a showing of prejudice” where the district court improperly replaced a
competent juror with an alternate. Bruckshaw, 58 A.3d at 153. For example —
although not a concern in Granados’s case — such a rule would insulate the
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replacement of jurors with alternates even if the replacement were racially
motivated. Cf. United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1350 (4th Cir. 1996)
(“Nelson argues that the court’s standard for replacing juries should be
heightened in the circumstances of this case because two black jurors were being
replaced with two white jurors.”).
Instead of requiring a showing of actual bias or incompetence, this Court
should reverse because, under the generally applicable standard for reversal,
there is a reasonable likelihood that, absent the error, the outcome would have
been more favorable to Granados. Knight, 734 P.2d at 919. And it should grant
that, in most circumstances, a strategically selected jury will yield a more
favorable result for a defendant than one that is selected over the defense’s
objection after the presentation of evidence has begun.
Furthermore, the evidence related to the shooting was weak. Even if the
evidence was minimally sufficient, it was not so convincing that any reasonable
juror would convict. See supra, Issue I. No witness identified Granados as the
shooter, R:608-10; 1009 (the only witness to make an identification did not select
Granados’s photo from a photo array), he had no motivation to shoot the victim,
R:1105, and his fingerprints were excluded in a test of the bumper a witness saw
the shooter touch. R:844-46.
In conclusion, the court erred when it dismissed the juror without
questioning her. The error was prejudicial because there is a reasonable
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likelihood that, absent the court's error, the result would have been more
favorable to Granados.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons argued in Issue I, Granados respectfully requests that this
Court reverse and vacate for insufficient evidence his convictions of attempted
murder, criminal mischief, and possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted
person.
For the reasons argued in Issue II, Granados respectfully requests that this
Court reverse all his convictions and remand for a new trial.
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The Order of the Court is stated below:
Dated: December 28, 2017
/s/ PAUL B PARKER
04:40:47 PM
District Court Judge

3RD DISTRICT COURT - SALT LAKE
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
______________________________________________________________________________________
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
JOSEPH CRESCENCIO GRANADOS,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT
Case No: 161906242 FS
Judge:
PAUL B PARKER
Date:
December 22, 2017

______________________________________________________________________________________
PRESENT
Clerk:
shantec
Prosecutor: BRADFORD D COOLEY
ADAM B BLANCH
Defendant Present
The defendant is in the custody of the Salt Lake County Jail
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID P S MACK
NICK FALCONE
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: September 23, 1982
Sheriff Office#: 380860
Audio
Tape Number:
S34
Tape Count: 9.02-9.48

CHARGES
1. ATTEMPTED MURDER - 1st Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
2. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of
3. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of
4. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of
5. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of
6. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
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Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
7. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
8. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
9. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
10. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
11. FELONY DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 12/22/2017 No Cause of Action
12. FAIL TO STOP OR RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLICE - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
13. CRIMINAL MISCHIEF:INTENTIONAL DAMAGE,DEFACE,DESTROY PROPERTY - 3rd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
14. POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
15. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
16. POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED - 2nd Degree Felony
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 10/20/2017 Guilty
SENTENCE PRISON
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED MURDER a 1st Degree Felony, the
defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than three years and which
may be life in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of FAIL TO STOP OR RESPOND AT COMMAND OF POLICE a
3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed
five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of CRIMINAL MISCHIEF:INTENTIONAL
DAMAGE,DEFACE,DESTROY PROPERTY a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an
indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison.
Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OF A DNGR WEAP BY RESTRICTED a 2nd
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one
year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison.
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To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your custody for
transportation to the Utah State Prison where the defendant will be confined.

SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE
To run consecutive. Counts 14 and 15 are consecutive with credit for time served and
closed.
ALSO KNOWN AS (AKA) NOTE
JOSEPH PSYCHO
CYKO
GF PSYCHO
J PSYCHO
JOSEPH GRANADOS

SENTENCE JAIL

Based on the defendant's conviction of POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a
Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 365 day(s)
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA a Class
B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a term of 180 day(s)
Credit is granted for 545 day(s) previously served.
Case No: 161906242 Date:
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Restitution
Amount: $3526.95 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: OFFICE FOR VICTIM OF CRIME
Restitution
Amount: $1200.00
Pay in behalf of: KIMBERLY N
Restitution
Amount: $375.00
Pay in behalf of: JOSE M
Defendant has a right to file a notice of appeal within 30 days of sentencing.
Motion to merge charges 2-11 into count 1 is granted.

End Of Order - Signature at the Top of the First Page
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the following people for
case 161906242 by the method and on the date specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

ADC ADC-court1@slco.org
ADC ADC-Transportation@slco.org
PRISON udc-records@utah.gov

12/28/2017
Date: ____________________

/s/ SHANTE COLLINS
______________________________
Deputy Court Clerk
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ADDENDUM B

1

MS. VALDEZ:

2

MR. FALCONE:

3

MR. COOLEY:

THE COURT:

7

MR. COOLEY:

8

THE COURT:

10

I think Mr. Falcone can find some

coverage for that.

6

9

And, Judge, I have something at 10 for

competency on another case.

4
5

I think so.

You guys are stuck here at 9:00.
We'll be here at 9:00.
We'll start promptly at 9:00.

If you

would be here at quarter to, and we'll be ready and we'll
proceed.

11

THE BAILIFF:

12

(Jury exits the courtroom.)

13

THE COURT:

All rise for the jury.

Have a seat.

14

the door is not closed.

15

instructions anyway.

16

All right.

17

MR. FALCONE:

Jury has now been excused,

I've got to go get the jury

Now the door is closed.

Judge, we'd like to start off by asking

18

the Court to direct a verdict in this case.

19

hear argument on that.

20

THE COURT:

21

MR. FALCONE:

Motions?

Would you like to

Yes.
All right.

So, Your Honor, there are

22

several charges, and we need to address some of these and what

23

the State has prevent -- presented as part -- part of their

24

evidence in this case.

25

1 of the information, and then we look at the continuing

So we have the attempted homicide Count
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1

counts, and we're going down to 13, a felony discharge of a

2

firearm.

3

So I'd like to address those as being the most

4

crucial for the Court's determination on how this case goes

5

forward.

6

shooting that happens in West -- in West Jordan.

7

then four hours later, right around there, there is a chase in

8

--

There are two parts to this case.

THE COURT:

9

Okay?

And

Four hours later?

MR. FALCONE:

10

Part 1 is a

Well, the first report of the shooting

11

comes in around 4:00.

12

with this detective or he hears the calls coming in about seven

13

o'clock, according to his testimony.

14

hour period that the shooting happens and then there's the

15

chase.

16

And so West Valley starts communicating

So there is that several

So in the meantime, this vehicle is somewhere, that

17

we don't know where it is.

And what is the evidence we have at

18

the scene of the shooting.

The evidence we have at the scene

19

of the shooting is that there were several witnesses there.

20

Some of them saw the shooting happening.

21

says that she actually has a sight and she's looking at the

22

person that is involved in the shooting, that's Ms. Henry.

23

Ms. Henry says that.

24

the car and actually take the bumper and put it in the back

25

seat of the car, so it's being handled.

One of the witnesses

She also sees this individual get out of
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1

But when she testifies, she says she has a perfect

2

memory, and then she presented with this photo lineup where she

3

picks the wrong person.

4

her in regards to identification.

5

That's all the evidence we have from

Then we have the alleged victim in the matter, who

6

also reports that he has no clear identification of the person

7

that shot at him at his vehicle.

8

majority of the shots fired, they're fired in the rear portion

9

of the car.

And if we look at the

So as a part of the homicide, even the attempted

10

homicide statute, there has to be intent to -- to kill, and

11

that's an imperfect attempt kill, because it's an attempted

12

homicide.

13

present.

14

But that intent has to be there, it has to be

So we can't really get there when we have, first of

15

all, no identification.

16

people that see this thing happen.

17

that are standing with their teenage children.

18

one of these witnesses via 911 call.

19

interviewed by the police at the time this all went down.

20

they're relying on the call, and then they talk to her or

21

communicate with her at some other time, but they never

22

communicate with her daughter who's old enough to definitely

23

see what's going on, and actually have some input on the ID.

Now remember, there were several other
There are two witnesses
The police get

But she's never
So

24

Then we have another person standing on her doorstep

25

looking at what's going on with her daughter who's in and out,
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1

possibly, or standing right behind her, also not and

2

interviewed by the police and never given a statement.

3

these witnesses cannot confirm Mr. Granados as being the person

4

that shot at the car.

5

happening in back of the car.

All of

Intent to kill, all the shots are

6

As a matter of fact, it appears that the one shot

7

that actually hit the alleged victim in the side, it's a --

8

it's a -- it looks like it's a stray, but never intended to

9

actually hit him, otherwise you'd be firing directly at him.

10

And once again, we have no idea who's doing that.

11

The State is making a lot of assumption in that

12

several-hour period as to whether Mr. Granados is the shooter

13

or not, just because he's in the vehicle at the time, that they

14

chase him through West Valley.

15

the night before.

16

him before that.

17

police.

18

City -- I mean, the West Jordan incident.

19

to connect him.

20

clear.

Additionally, they chased him

He tried to get away and then they chased
We have evidence.

So he runs from the

That doesn't make him a shooter in the West Valley
There has to be more

The nexus has to be more clear, and it is not

21

The Court actually ruled yesterday or gave

22

instruction to the jury that identification has not been made

23

in relationship to the shooting.

24

still be the Court's position now.

25

then Counts 1 through 13 have to be dismissed because it's a

And I believe that would
And if that is the case,
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1

factual question of whether there's identification or not.

2

And there has not been identification of the person

3

that was shooting out of his vehicle, and there's different

4

variations of what everybody sees of how that shooting is

5

happening, and Mr. Granados' gun's never found, obtained, so we

6

have none of that evidence.

7

Evidence is mishandled continuously.

Different

8

people are in and out of the car, the car's transported, people

9

don't know where the car is or in relationship to the

10

investigation.

11

Okay.

Now what do we have ID on?

We do have ID 14

12

through 20, and thus -- that's in regard to the chase and in

13

regard to the detention and arrest of Mr. Granados after he is

14

chased.

15

identify Mr. Granados, because they found him, they got him.

16

We saw the video.

17

So all these officers that testified about that, did

Okay.

That's the chase.

So right now the defense, I think we're in good

18

standing to make this motion, is asking the court to dismiss 1

19

through 13 of the information based on no identification, the

20

faulty evidence that was found, and absence of any other

21

evidence that links Mr. Granados to the shooting.

22

submit with that.

23

THE COURT:

The motion will be denied.

So I'll

There has

24

been quite substantial evidence to -- for which the jury could

25

infer the defendant is the one who did this.

So I think we
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1

start with the identification issues.

2

statement by the victim in this case that he saw a single

3

Hispanic male with tattoos on his arm in the car and that was

4

the person that fired the shots at him.

5

that was -- what was her name?

6

with her -- Ms. Wood who heard four shots, and then a little

7

bit of a pause and heard more, saw a car pass.

8

maroon car, and I guess I need to back up.

9

Of course there is the

There was the witness

Excuse me.

Who was standing

The car was a

The victim identified it as a maroon kind of a

10

mid-size car with -- that hit him in the rear.

11

that would cause that damage to his car, Ms. Wood saw damage to

12

the front of the car, saw the front passenger side kind of

13

caved in and identified a white triangle in the back of the

14

car, which when it was found by the police later in the chase,

15

did, in fact, have that little triangle for the child on board.

16

There was an officer that saw a headlight set up that

The inferences

17

the other witness identified as falling off the car, that was

18

Ms. Henry.

The car when it was found was missing the

19

headlight.

She also identified the individual that stopped and

20

picked up the bumper and then put it in the back of the car.

21

That bumper was found in the car.

22

having a round face, dark eyes, short hair, dark hair, and

23

although she did not pick him out, was not sure, and frankly,

24

as I reviewed the lineup, is fairly remarkable for all the

25

people being in there and having a facial features very

Described the defendant as
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1
2

consistent with the defendant in this case.
The defendant was seen from the car.

There was

3

testimony that this was, I believe his wife's or his

4

girlfriend's car that he had evaded the police the day before

5

in the car, that he was a person who engaged within two hours,

6

and I heard it was just shortly after 6:00 when they started

7

that, led them in quite an extraordinary chase.

8

from that is that he is the one that fired the shots.

9

there's more than enough to identify him.

10

The inference
I think

As far as my comments they hadn't been able to

11

identify him, that perhaps was too strong.

12

opinion and a statement by the officer calling him

13

various -- or giving his opinions about him.

14

that's something that counsel will refer to in the -- in their

15

closing arguments, I will have to instruct the jury further

16

that they certainly may infere from -- any of the evidence, the

17

identification for which they seek.

18

a characterization given that evidence at that particular time.

19

I was reacting to a

I certainly -- if

I was simply objecting to

I'd also note, as far as an attempt, that the -- the

20

defendant is accused and the evidence was clear that the person

21

who the jury may infere is the defendant, followed closely the

22

victim's car, rammed the car in a matter that drove -- forced

23

him off the road into another car and then up on across the

24

curb on the sidewalk.

25

location of where the defendant was into the vehicle, and they

The bullets went roughly from the
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1

were sufficiently, if his direction and -- and number that the

2

jury could very well find that he intended to kill the victim

3

when he shot at him, so the motion's denied.

4

MR. MACK:

5

THE COURT:

6

MR. FALCONE:

7

Okay.

8

THE COURT:

9

Okay.
Do you have other motions?
Do you have any other motions, Dave?

We have no other motions.
All right.

Let's talk about jury

instruction then.

10

And I fixed the one as I indicated, adding the word

11

"intent" on intentionally discharged the firearm for all of the

12

discharge of a firearm charges.

13

MR. COOLEY:

Your Honor, defense counsel and I

14

discussed that.

15

prong of the discharge statute, that I included in the proposed

16

elements instructions, it becomes general intent.

17

discharge a firearm in the direction of any person knowing or

18

having reason to believe that any person may be in danger, you

19

don't need to intentionally discharge the firearm.

20

point I -- I think the statute, by leaving it out where it

21

includes it in the other prongs, I believe that indicates that

22

it's a general intent with respect to the mechanical side of

23

things.

24
25

My position would be that with respect to the

If you

At that

With respect to the act itself, I -- it doesn't say
you have to intentionally discharge a firearm.

You do have to

01033

229

ADDENDUM C

1

(Video playing)

2

Q.

What road are you traveling on there?

3

A.

We're northbound on Redwood Road. I believe we're

4

approaching 500 South. Nope, that's on the end.

5

(Following is audio playing)

6

Echo 22, do we have [inaudible]

7
8
9
10

Q. (BY MR. COOLEY) During this period, what was the -what was your speed, do you recall?
A.

Uh, my speed ranged from 45 to 60 miles -- 65 miles

an hour is what I'm approximating.

11

Q.

What -- what road are you crossing right now?

12

A.

That is I-80, the I-80 overpass that we're passing

13

and turning left westbound onto the on-ramp to 215 and I-80

14

here.

15
16

Q.

The narration that you are hearing in the background,

was that another officer that's involved in this?

17

A.

It is. On the radio?

18

Q.

Yeah.

19

A.

Yes, that's the No. 2 vehicle which is the vehicle

20

behind me that's calling out the pursuit. That's Sergeant

21

Gray.

22
23

Q.

Okay.
THE COURT: Let's pause for a moment, if you can.

24

Let's take about a 15-minute break. It looks like everyone is

25

getting a little tired. Let's give you your morning break.

OFFICER GARRETT TAN - Direct by MR. COOLEY
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1

We'll take 15 minutes.

2

THE BAILIFF: All rise for the jury.

3

THE COURT: Have a seat, please.

4

You can just put that microphone -- you don't have to

5
6

resume the stand.
The reason I did that is Juror No. 16 keeps falling

7

asleep. And yesterday the same thing, is the reason I took

8

some breaks. And I'm a little concerned right in the middle of

9

the presentation that usually would take someone's attention,

10
11

she's noticeably falling asleep.
MR. MACK: I got to say I'm getting tired of the

12

videos too, but... Perhaps we can just agree that we have a

13

new alternate rather than the last juror, assuming that

14

everybody, everybody survives till --

15

THE COURT: Well, let's do this. You can talk about

16

it. I just wanted to bring your attention now. And I'll keep

17

trying to watch and take breaks. I did it yesterday to have

18

them stand up and I'll continue to do it, but I just wanted to

19

bring it to everyone's attention.

20
21
22

MR. MACK: Thank you. I hadn't noticed that
honestly, but I will -THE COURT: Well, it's probably your view. But I had

23

my clerk tell me that yesterday and I watched her. And like I

24

say, it's the reason I stopped and had them all stand up at one

25

point yesterday. And like I say, today she just keeps closing
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1

her eyes and her head rocks back and forth. She's clearly

2

falling asleep.

3

MR. MACK: Is that -- I'm not sure who 16 is.

4

THE COURT: It's the older lady in the -- she has

5
6
7

kind of white hair.
MR. MACK: Is she the one that asked for the people
to speak up?

8

THE COURT: Yes.

9

MR. MACK: Okay.

10

THE COURT: Yes. All right. Let's take a break.

11

MR. FALCONE: Thank you, Judge.

12

(Recess taken by the court.)

13

THE COURT: For the record, let me tell you this.

14

Again, the defendant is here. I am going to dismiss Juror

15

No. 16. I'm going to do it at the end of the morning. Sitting

16

here, I've sat there and thought about it. I've had input from

17

both of my staff, Shane my clerk, as well as Shante, who has

18

seen her sleeping for a significant period of time.

19

MR. MACK: Okay.

20

THE COURT: And she was obviously falling asleep

21

here. I just don't know a way to survive that and have the

22

trial go as it needs to go and have someone who is missing that

23

amount of time.

24
25

MR. MACK: Judge, if I can make a record. We -- I
haven't noticed this and I'm not saying those observations
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1

aren't accurate, but I do know that in many of the trials that

2

I've done, I've seen jurors nodding off on occasion. We

3

would -- and I think -- and I don't know if this extends beyond

4

today, but if it's just today --

5

THE COURT: Well --

6

MR. MACK: -- starting these videos, I don't know

7
8

that's a crucial, critical thing -THE COURT: An let me help you with that, because it

9

happened yesterday. And again, talking to those people who

10

were with me up on the stand, they saw her up to about five

11

minutes asleep.

12

MR. MACK: Okay.

13

THE COURT: I saw her asleep yesterday as well. And

14

that's the reason I had them stand yesterday because she was --

15

she was asleep.

16

MR. MACK: Okay.

17

THE COURT: So it's not just one day. It's two days.

18
19

And it's over a significant period of time.
MR. MACK: Okay. And just for the record, we would

20

object to it. But is your plan then -- I'm sorry. You said

21

after today's session?

22

THE COURT: Yes, what I thought, we have about

23

another hour today. And so what I thought we'd do is conclude

24

the trial. I'll have her remain and then I'll excuse her. I

25

didn't want to stick her on the spot.
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1

MR. MACK: Yeah.

2

THE COURT: Okay.

3

MR. MACK: All right. Thank you.

4

MR. COOLEY: You said adjourn the trial. You mean

5

adjourn for the day?

6

THE COURT: Adjourn for the day. Yeah. Okay.

7

Anything else? Can we bring the jury?

8

MR. MACK: I think we're ready.

9

MR. COOLEY: Yeah.

10

THE COURT: All right.

11

THE BAILIFF: All rise for the jury.

12

Please be seated.

13

THE COURT: All right. Let's have the witness resume

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

the stand. Or standing where he was, either one.
I guess I need to ask the jury these questions,
though, as you get up and get prepared.
Did anyone talk to anyone or let anyone talk to you
about the case? If so, raise your hand.
And I need that TV moved for just a minute. Would
you pull it toward you, Officer.
Did anyone send or receive electronic communications
about the case? If so, raise your hand.
Did anyone seek or obtain or get outside information
from the internet or other courses? If so, raise your hand.
Did anyone talk to parties, witnesses, show your
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1

THE BAILIFF: All rise for the jury.

2

THE COURT: If you would remain in the courtroom.

3

Stay here.

4

JUROR: I will.

5

THE COURT: All right.

6

MR. MACK: Judge, can we approach?

7

THE COURT: Yes. Please be seated.

8

(Following is discussion held at sidebar.)

9

MR. MACK: So I just wanted to embellish the record a

10

little bit, but I'm wondering, though -- well, I just want -- I

11

don't want her to necessarily go because I see her taking

12

notes. I see her trying to pay attention. And I wonder if

13

maybe an admonishment or a question, even a question of her if

14

she feels like she hasn't -- she's missed some parts or

15

something before she's just dismissed.

16

MR. COOLEY: I think it would be appropriate to ask

17

her -- I'm sure she knows that she's been drifting off to

18

engage. She feels whether it changes anybody's mind --

19
20

THE COURT: I'm still going to dismiss her.
[inaudible]

21

MR. MACK: Okay.

22

THE COURT: [inaudible]

23

(End of sidebar discussion)

24

THE COURT: Ma'am, I am going to let you go from the

25

jury. And I appreciate how hard you've tried and how diligent
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1

you've been. I've seen that. Unfortunately, I've also watched

2

you fall asleep a couple of times. And it is just so important

3

that you see and hear all that occurs here. Rather than

4

causing an error to be in this trial, I'm being a little more

5

cautious and so I will relieve you of jury service. So you're

6

done, but thank you very much for your efforts.

7

JUROR: Thank you.

8

THE COURT: All right.

9

THE BAILIFF: All rise for the jury.

10

MR. MACK: Judge, can we just at least make a

11

inquiry? I think that needs to be done for the record.

12

THE COURT: Well --

13

MR. MACK: If she's -- I think it should also be

14

pointed out when the Court asked her to remain back, she got up

15

to leave with the rest of the jury and had to be told a couple

16

of times by the juror seated next to her, no. He actually

17

asked her to remain.

18

THE COURT: Well, let me tell you why I decided to go

19

ahead and do it. You recall I brought that up before the

20

break. At the break I timed it that way because she was -- she

21

was falling asleep. And what I saw specifically is her look

22

up, close her eyes, and then the head kind of nod forward, and

23

it happened repeatedly. And finally, I was concerned about

24

going any further because of what she was clearly missing.

25

The problem is I had that complaint from both of my
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1

assistants, from my clerk and from Shante, both of whom watched

2

her yesterday. In fact, I got a note about it yesterday that

3

she was falling asleep. I tried to observe it and saw it

4

myself. And again, I had to call and try to get them all up,

5

to stand up and shake it off. I did that because -- for her.

6

This wasn't just one time where she just kind of

7

dozed off for a minute. And I agree that she was trying to be

8

a diligent juror, but all three of us saw it multiple times

9

during significant parts of the trial. And it just got to be

10

such a point that I cannot allow -- allow her to go forward.

11

She has missed a significant amount. It doesn't matter at this

12

point whether she knows that she missed it or not. The fact is

13

that I observed her and my staff observed her missing

14

significant parts of the trial. I just have to make the call

15

on that. And that's the reason for my decision.

16
17

MR. MACK: I understand, Judge. If I could just add
a little bit --

18

THE COURT: Go ahead.

19

MR. MACK: -- to our objection. Our objection

20

previously was we did not necessarily -- we did not want to

21

have her released. I mean, we strategically selected her. We

22

wanted her to be on this jury.

23

And I would just note that at the bench conference,

24

Mr. Cooley and I, before the juror was dismissed, suggested to

25

the Court that you inquire of the juror whether or not she --
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1

well, at least to ascertain how much she thought she maybe

2

missed or how many times she maybe was asleep, if she was able

3

to take notes or just to evaluate herself. That's all. I mean

4

we made that request. I understand the Court's ruling, but

5

that would be our objection.

6

THE COURT: All right. And thank you. And again,

7

the reason as I didn't do that is because it hit the point that

8

it was just obvious and that it was clear that she missed a

9

significant amount. And frankly, it wasn't going to be very

10

persuasive to me if she was aware that she missed, because she

11

clearly missed it and because she was asleep.

12

I would note from the record, when I told her that it

13

was because she was asleep, she just nodded in the affirmative

14

and let it go at that. So anyway. We'll --

15
16

MR. MACK: If you see me sleeping this afternoon,
will you just let me go -- tomorrow. Tomorrow.

17

THE COURT: I will have a crowded courtroom in an

18

hour. So if you could take care of your things so they will

19

not be disturbed. Again, I offer the use of the closet if

20

anybody wants a briefcase or stack paper in there.

21
22

We'll be in recess and adjourned until 9:00 tomorrow
morning.

23

MR. FALCONE: Thank you, Judge.

24

MR. COOLEY: Thank you.

25

(Court was adjourned at 11:55 a.m.)
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